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Introduction
Drug-induced deaths in the United States have increased 280 percent since 1999 and now represent the largest major category of external causes of death by a wide margin: there were 47,055 deaths due to drug overdoses in 2014 compared to 32,675 due to motor vehicle accidents. 1 These facts underscore a growing need to understand how to reduce drug-related harms. Towards this end, a large body of work has shown that policies targeting the supply of drugs are rarely effective. 2 In contrast, recent work indicates that expanding access to substance-abuse treatment (SAT) facilities significantly reduces severe drug abuse, as measured by drug-induced mortality (Swensen, 2015) .
While this evidence highlights that investments in SAT can improve outcomes for some individuals, it does not necessarily reflect a broad-based benefit for communities that might be considering making such investments. In this paper we fill this important gap in the literature by estimating the effects of SAT facilities on local crime.
There are several mechanisms through which SAT facilities may affect local crime. As outlined in Goldstein's (1985) influential tripartite conceptual framework for the drugs-violence nexus, drugs may affect violence through psychopharmacological effects, economically compulsive effects, and systemic effects. In these terms, SAT could be expected to reduce violence by: (i) reducing the use of drugs that lead to aggressive behavior (though there may be some offsetting effects caused by withdrawal), (ii) by reducing conflicts associated with financially motivated crimes committed by addicts seeking funds to buy drugs, and (iii) by reducing violence among and against those associated with the drug trade. 3 Moreover, drug-abuse treatment may reduce gun carrying through all three of these mechanisms, which could serve to reduce the amount-and intensity-of violence in communities. It is also important to keep in mind that a relatively large share of drug users have mental health problems that contribute to their addiction and to violent behaviors (Lavine, 1997; Hoaken and Stewart, 2003) . As such, we could expect SAT to reduce violence because it can itself include-or can direct patients towards-treatment for underlying mental health problems that contribute to violence (Lavine, 1997; Marcotte and Markowitz, 2011) . Finally, SAT treatment may reduce criminal activity through positive spillover effects on friends and family members of those receiving treatment.
1 See Rudd et al. (2016) and NCSA (2015) . 2 See for instance Dinardo (1993) , Yuan and Caulkins (1998) , Miron (2003) , Cunningham and Liu (2003) , Kuziemko and Levitt (2004) , Dobkin and Nicosia (2009) , Cunningham and Finlay (2013) , and Dobkin, Nicosia, Weinberg (2014) .
3 Prior studies have documented causal effects of drug activity on community violence by exploiting variation in drug use induced by price shocks (Markowitz, 2001 (Markowitz, , 2005 and by exploiting variation in the timing with which specific drugs became available across different cities (Evans, et al., 2012; Fryer et al., 2013) .
Although these mechanisms highlight how SAT facilities can reduce crime through their effect on drug abuse, there are other mechanisms through which we might expect SAT facilities to increase local crime. Featuring prominently in not-in-my-backyard arguments against SAT facilities is the notion that such facilities pose risks by drawing into the area individuals who have relatively high rates of crime perpetration (drug users). Going beyond the idea of shifting crime perpetration from one place to another, SAT facilities could increase crime by altering the social and environmental context faced by drug users. That is, by altering the types of people and places that they encounter and with which they interact.
In this study we contribute to this policy debate by quantifying the effects of SAT facilities on crime. Specifically, we use annual county-level data on the number of SAT facilities to evaluate the degree to which crime rates change when SAT facilities open and close. We consider various crime outcomes measured over time at the county and law-enforcement agency level, based on data from the National Center for Health Statistics and the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Program. These panel data allow us to include a rich set of fixed effects (county/agency and state-by-year) and control variables (demographics, various measures of economic conditions, and law enforcement presence) in our models, so the estimates are identified based on plausibly exogenous variation.
Several ancillary analyses support the validity of this research design, including analyses that demonstrate that outcomes in an area change after but not before the number of facilities change.
Our approach shifts the focus from the effects of SAT on those who receive treatment to the effects of SAT facilities on the communities they serve. This allows us to make several contributions.
First, we consider outcomes that tend to be beyond the scope of randomized control trials (RCTs), which are limited by small samples, short follow-up periods, and the potential for false reporting.
In particular, our approach allows us to consider severe-but-infrequent outcomes (e.g., homicide) and behaviors that individuals are likely to conceal (e.g., sexual assault). Second, our estimates reflect the effects of SAT on patients and the spillover effects onto the broader community, inclusive of any spillover effects on nearby friends and family and on the market for illegal drugs. In so doing, our estimates will allow for more comprehensive cost-benefit considerations. Third, whereas the nature of RCTs tends to require the use of small localized samples, which may have limited external validity, our use of administrative data allows us to obtain estimates that reflect the effects of SAT facilities across the United States.
Our analysis reveals significant and robust evidence that expanding access to SAT through additional treatment facilities reduces local crime. The effects appear to be particularly pronounced 3 for relatively serious violent and financially motivated crimes: homicides, aggravated assaults, robbery, and motor vehicle theft. We do not find significant effects on more frequent but less serious crimes (simple assault, burglary, and larceny), nor do we find a significant effect on sexual assault. Overall, we find that an additional treatment facility reduces felony-type crimes by 0.10 percent annually. We show that the estimated effect on homicides is present across three different sources of homicide data.
Despite the various contributions of our research described above, there are some limitations that bear noting. First, our empirical approach, which focuses on county-and law-enforcementagency-level aggregates, implies that we cannot separate the effects of SAT facilities on those who receive treatment from the effects of SAT facilities on the broader community. That said, we view this as a reasonable tradeoff in order to be able to speak to the effects on the community as a whole.
Second, while there is significant variation across SAT facilities in the types of treatment that they offer, our estimates will reflect an average of the effects of these facilities. Finally, openings and closings of SAT facilities are not random. While this has the potential to compromise our ability to identify causal effects, our ancillary analyses, which are discussed in detail in subsequent sections, demonstrate that it is unlikely in light of our empirical strategy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant background on drug abuse and treatment in the United States, in addition to related studies that have considered the effects of SAT on crime. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data and our empirical approach in detail. Section 5 begins with a replication and extension of Swensen (2015) to show the effects of SAT facilities on severe drug abuse and then presents the results of our analyses that focus on crime. We offer concluding remarks in Section 6.
Background

Substance Abuse and Treatment
According to the National Survey of Drug Use and Health over 21.5 million people in the U.S. are classified as having a substance-use disorder (CBHSQ, 2015) . 4 A high incidence of substance abuse is also apparent in crime perpetration, with 40 percent of convicted violent criminals being under the influence of alcohol and nearly 60 percent of all arrestees testing positive for some illicit substance 4 Based on criteria specified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition (DSM-IV) at the time of arrest. 5 The annual societal costs of drug abuse solely in terms of drug-related crime are estimated at over 56 billion dollars. 6
Though substance-abuse treatment is a promising avenue to reduce these costs, treatment rates for those in need remain very low. In 2014, 85 percent of those abusing or dependent on an illicit substance did not receive treatment and despite the prevalence of alcohol and drugs among arrestees, 70 percent of arrestees have never been in any form of drug or alcohol treatment (ONDCP, 2014) . Notably, recent changes brought about by the Affordable Care Act are expected to increase coverage and take-up of treatment (Buck, 2011; Beronio, Glied, and Frank 2014) .
In this context, the number of substance-abuse treatment facilities may be a particularly relevant policy parameter. In the United States, over 14,500 stand-alone treatment facilities are the primary setting for delivery of substance-abuse treatment, offering a wide range of drug-treatment programs and related services (SAMHSA, 2014) . Local treatment centers most commonly offer outpatient care to deliver treatment programs such as detoxification, methadone maintenance, regular outpatient, adolescent outpatient, and drug-court programs (SAMHSA, 2014) . For more serious substance-abuse problems, facilities provide residential treatment in which clients temporarily live at the treatment site (e.g. inpatient detoxification, chemical dependency programs, therapeutic communities). While treatment programs vary substantially and often target particular demographic groups or specific drug addictions, all treatment approaches share similar goals to mitigate the consequences of drug abuse and encourage healthier lifestyles.
More broadly, the substance-abuse treatment industry includes profit, non-profit, and public providers, the bulk of which (87 percent) are privately-owned facilities. 7 Though the objective functions of facilities may differ somewhat by ownership status and treatment focus, the decision to open or close a treatment facility likely depends crucially on (i) a perceived need for treatment providers or opportunities to improve upon currently offered treatment services and (ii) the ability to secure funding for treatment services from either public or private third-party payers (SAMHSA 2011) . Given the high need for addiction treatment and existing evidence of binding treatment capacity constraints and long wait lists, the availability of funds is particularly relevant when considering the predictors of facility openings and closings. 8 5 See https://ncadd.org/about-addiction/alcohol-drugs-and-crime. 6 Estimates based on the 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment counducted by the National Drug Intelligence Center.
7 According to the 2013 National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services, 60 percent of facilities are nonprofit, 30 percent are for profit, and 10 percent are public.
8 Evidence suggests that capacity concerns and being put on a wait list are important barriers to treatment enrollment (Appel et al., 2004; Friedmann et al., 2003; Pollini et al., 2006) . Relatedly, Dave and Mukerjee (2011) Unlike general health care, which relies on funding through insurance mechanisms, substanceabuse treatment relies primarily on public funding in the form of federal block grants and state subsidies. That said, recent mental health parity legislation and the rise of managed-care contracts have increased the importance of public and private insurance revenue to providers (Horgan and Merrick, 2001; Olmstead and Sindelar, 2004) . Assuming these sources of financing generally increase with drug abuse and related problems, analyses of the effect of treatment provision on drug-related outcomes may understate the actual effect of treatment.
Related Literature on SAT and Crime
An extensive literature has evaluated the relationship between substance-abuse treatment programs and criminal activities, including some that use "the gold standard" for empirical research, randomized control trials (RCTs). In a widely-cited meta analysis, Pendergast et al. (2002) reviewed 78 studies of SAT, 60 percent of which used random or quasi-random assignment to treatment and 25 of which examined crime outcomes. The authors found an average 13 percent decline in criminal involvement as a result of treatment. 9 More recent reviews of specific treatment approaches provide consistent evidence that criminal involvement declines during treatment and mixed evidence when considering longer-run crime outcomes (Amato et al., 2005; Holloway et al., 2006; Egli et al., 2009; Mattick et al., 2014) .
The existing literature also adds insight into the efficacy of specific treatment settings in reducing drug-related crime. Some of the more convincing and consistent evidence comes from studies evaluating prison-based drug treatment. This is partly due to the relative ease of employing a randomized treatment design and the ability to consider recidivism rates rather than relying on self-reported criminal activity. 10 Summarizing the literature, Mitchell et. al (2012) review 74 studies of prison-based treatment programs and conclude that substance-abuse treatment for inmates reduces recidivism by 15 percent. Existing evidence also suggests that court-mandated treatment programs, which account for a third of all treatment admissions, can be effective in reducing crime. 11
For instance, Wilson, Mitchell, and Mackenzie (2006) identify and review 55 quasi-experimental and analyze the effect of state legislation that reduces out-of pocket costs for mental health and substance-abuse treatment and find a relatively small effect on treatment admissions. They argue that the effect on admissions is muted, in part, because of treatment capacity constraints suggested by limited growth in the number of treatment facilities and increasing treatment waiting periods.
9 Crime outcomes included self-reported crimes and official records on arrest, conviction and incarceration. As such, this review includes evidence from crime outcomes during and after treatment.
10 Treatment rates increased by 34 percent among state inmates and 90 percent among federal inmates from 1997-2004. 11 See SAMHSA (2014) for a breakdown of admissions by treatment referral source.
experimental evaluations of drug courts. They concluded that court-referred treatment does lower re-arrest rates though the estimated effects were notably smaller and less precise among evaluations that employed randomization. They also find consistent evidence of declines in re-offending both during and following court-referred treatment programs, however the estimated effects do decay over time.
Together, this literature provides consistent evidence that treatment programs can reduce crime.
While these studies have made significant contributions to our knowledge, the merit of our study is predicated on the notion that some of the most important questions about the effects of SAT are only likely to be answered using alternative methods applied to observational data. In particular, our study shifts the focus from the effects of SAT on those who receive treatment to the effects of SAT facilities on the communities they serve and uses data that allows us to obtain estimates that reflect the effects of SAT facilities on local-area crime across the United States.
To our knowledge only one other recent working paper attempts to consider the effects of SAT on crime in such a comprehensive fashion. Wen, Hockenberry, and Cummings (2014) consider the effects of changes in SAT rates on property and violent crimes using data collected by the FBI that span the United States. Their instrumental variables approach relies on the assumption that state health insurance expansions (made possible through Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability waivers) only relate to changes in crime through their impacts on SAT. 12 This assumption could be violated if, for example, expanding access to health insurance affects crime through its impact on treatment for mental health problems or through its impacts on overall health and well being. As all observational studies rely on fundamentally untestable assumptions, and as any body of evidence is more compelling when similar results are documented using approaches that rely on different assumptions, we view our work as an important contribution that complements this prior study, which reports that increases in substance-use-disorder treatment significantly reduces robbery, aggravated assault, and larceny.
Data
Following Swensen (2015), we identify county-level changes in the number of substance-abuse treatment facilities using data from the U.S. Census Bureau's County Business Patterns (CBP). The CBP data reports the annual number of substance-abuse treatment clinics (a single physical location) in each U.S. county for both outpatient and residential facilities from 1999-2012. 13 Although classified separately in the CBP data, residential and outpatient establishments often offer both residential and outpatient treatment services with 90 percent of all admissions occurring in an outpatient setting (SAMHSA, 2014) . Therefore, estimating the effects separately for outpatient and residential facilities would not be informative as residential and outpatient services are not distinctly identified. As such, we combine outpatient and residential classifications using the total count of establishments as an indicator for county-level provision of substance-abuse treatment.
We merge CBP data with several independent data sources for drug abuse and criminal activity.
We first revisit the effect of SAT on drug abuse, as measured by drug-related deaths, using annual county-level mortality data from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) Multiple Cause To estimate the effect of treatment facilities on local-area crime we use the NCHS mortality data, which provide a measure of homicides, and the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) which are compilation of annual crime statistics reported by local law-enforcement agencies across the United
States to the FBI. 16 Specifically, we use the offenses known data from the Offenses Known and Cleared by Arrests UCR segment. These data, which we will refer to as UCR Offenses Known, include the most commonly reported violent and property crimes including criminal homicide, sexual assault, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny theft, and motor vehicle theft. We focus on known offenses in order to capture crimes that come to the attention of law enforcement, as opposed to alternative data sets that are available but are restricted to crimes that have been cleared by arrest.
In addition, we use the UCR Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) to consider additional details of the victims, offenders, and circumstances associated with homicides. The SHR is an incident-
13
The following six-digit NAICS codes identify treatment establishments: 621420 -"Outpatient mental health and substance abuse centers" and 623220-"Residential mental health and substance abuse facilities."
14 In particular, we use the following ICD-10 codes to measure drug-induced mortality: X40-X45, X60-X65, X85, Y10-Y15.
15 As reported by Stevens et al. (2015) , the Cancer-SEER population data are more accurate than data interpolated from the Census because they "are based on an algorithm that incorporates information from Vital statistics, IRS migration files, and the Social Security database."
16 NCHS homicides include deaths by another person with the intent to injure or kill. They do not include homicides due to legal intervention, operations of war, or homicides from the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. level dataset that includes detailed information on each homicide as voluntarily reported by agencies participating in the UCR program. For agencies that do report homicides in the SHR, we impute zeros by expanding the SHR to the same agency-years as our UCR Offenses Known sample. We link the UCR agency-level data with county-level CBP data using the primary county in which each municipality resides and calculate crime rates using the annual reported population covered by each municipal agency.
We restrict our analysis to U.S. counties with at least one treatment facility over the [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] time period and counties with available identifiers in the 48 contiguous states. 17 The resulting data include treatment facility, mortality, and crime data in 48 states, spanning 14 years. 18 In Table 1 we present summary statistics for our sample, weighted by the relevant populations. CBP data indicate that counties have a population-weighted average of 49.5 SAT facilities. Importantly, there is substantial variation in the number of facilities with the average county experiencing 5.8 net facility openings and 3.7 net closings from 1999 to 2012, where a net opening is an observed increase in the number of facilities from one year to the next and a net closing is defined similarly.
For reference, Table 1 also shows summary statistics for each mortality and crime outcome used in our analysis.
Empirical Approach
We identify the effects of SAT facilities using year-to-year variation within counties driven by facility openings and closings, controlling for state-by-year shocks common to areas within a state in addition to time-varying county characteristics. As we analyze both county and agency-level outcomes, we operationalize this strategy using a regression model that includes either county or agency fixed effects in addition to state-by-year fixed effects and county-year covariates: 18 Over the same time-frame, the aggregate number of facilities increases from 12,428 to 16,959.
where y ast represents outcomes in area a (either county or agency) in state s in year t. We use log rates to measure drug abuse and crime outcomes. We add one to all counts before constructing log rates to avoid dropping area-year observations for which the outcome would otherwise be undefined, but we show that results of all of our analyses are similar if we instead simply focus on areas that always have a positive count, with the sample being defined separately for each outcome considered. In support of using the log transformation, we have verified that Poisson models (where computationally feasible) yield very similar estimates. F acilities cs,t−1 represents the number of SAT facilities in county c in state s in year t-1, α as are area fixed effects, α st are state-by-year fixed effects, and X cst includes county unemployment rates, the number of firm births, number of law enforcement officers per 100,000, and the fraction of the county population that is: white, black, male, less than 10 years old, 10-19 years old, ... , 60-69 years old. 19 Finally, ast is a random error term that we allow to be correlated across time within a county and across all counties in any given year by estimating two-way standard errors following Cameron et al. (2011) . 20 To be clear, our measure of facilities is a county-level measure even when we are considering crimes at the agency level. We also note that our main results are based on regressions that weight by the relevant population size in order to improve efficiency.
Our focus on within-area variation accounts for fixed characteristics of areas (both observable and unobservable) that may be correlated with the number of SAT facilities in the county and our outcomes of interest. For example, this approach will address the fact that there are inherent differences between urban and rural counties. The inclusion of state-by-year fixed effects account for aggregate time-varying shocks, such as aggregate economic conditions or changes in the national drug-control strategy. They also control for state-specific shocks such as changes in state funding for law enforcement services. The controls for unemployment rates and firm births account for the possibility that our outcomes of interest and treatment facilities may both be related to local economic conditions. The controls for demographics account for the possibility that compositional changes in a county's population may affect outcomes and investments in SAT facilities.
Our empirical approach closely follows Swensen (2015) , who also conducts several ancillary analyses in support the validity of the research design. In particular, Swensen demonstrates that additional facilities lead to increases in treatment admissions and that the effects of additional facilities are greatest for causes of death that are most closely related to drug abuse. 21 Importantly, a third of all treatment admission are court-ordered, often as an alternative to incarceration. As such, increases in admissions due to an additional SAT facility may correspond with more drug offenders in public, leading to estimates that understate any decreases in drug-related criminal activity.
To address concerns regarding reverse causality, Swensen plots drug-induced mortality rates leading up to and following changes in the number of facilities and finds no evidence of systematic deviations of drug-related mortality from expected levels prior to changes in the number of facilities. Furthermore, his estimates from models that consider additional lags and leads of treatment facilities show that the that previous-and current-year changes in the number of facilities is significantly related to drug-induced mortality, but that drug-induced mortality is not related to the number of facilities in future periods. 22 In a similar fashion, we estimate a version of Eq. (1) that also considers the effect of the number of facilities in the current, previous and subsequent years on the outcomes that are the focus of this paper. The results of this analysis, discussed in more detail below, indicate that changes in the number of treatment facilities are also not driven by recent changes in drug abuse or crime. That said, we note that our estimates would understate the benefits of SAT facilities if they opened in response to recent increases in drug abuse and related crimes.
Results
Revisiting the Effects of SAT Facilities on Drug-Induced Mortality
We begin our analysis of the effects of SAT facilities by documenting their effects on serious drug abuse measured by drug-induced mortality rates at the county level. Specifically, we expand on Swensen's (2015) analysis by adding four additional years of restricted-use NCHS mortality data to bring it in line with the years of data used in our analysis of crime, which run through 2012.
In Table 2 , we show the results of this analysis, using logged drug-induced mortality rates as the outcome. Columns 1-5 report the estimates from increasingly flexible specifications: Column 1 shows estimates based on a model that only includes county and year fixed effects; Column 2 shows estimates that additionally control for state-by-year fixed effects; and Columns 3-5 show estimates that additionally control for county-level time-varying measures of demographics, economic conditions, and the size of the police force. 23 With the exception of the Column 1 estimate, which omits controls for state-by-year fixed effects, the estimates are precise and similar in magnitude across specifications. They indicate a 0.50 percent decline in drug-induced mortality rates associated with an additional SAT facility in a county. 24 This estimate is very similar to the estimated effect of 0.42 percent reported in Swensen (2015) .
Estimated Effects on Crime
Homicides
Before turning to estimates that are based on Uniform Crime Reports data, we begin our analysis of crime by analyzing homicide deaths recorded in NCHS mortality data. Though these also include justified homicides, 94 percent are unjustified criminal homicides and, as such, they can shed light on the degree to which treatment interventions affect the most serious and costly form of criminal activity. 25 The results of this analysis, shown in the first panel of Table 3 , provide causal evidence that county-level homicide rates are reduced by SAT facilities. Specifically, the estimates indicate a 0.24 percent decline in intentional homicide death rates associated with an additional SAT facility.
In the second and third panels of Table 3 we investigate the effects on homicide rates using law-enforcement-agency-level data from the UCR's Offenses Known and Supplemental Homicide
Reports databases, respectively. We continue to estimate the same models when using these data, but use agency fixed effects instead of county fixed effects and use agency covered population as the denominator to construct homicide rates. Analyses of these data continue to indicate that SAT facilities significantly reduce homicides in areas covered by municipal law-enforcement agencies, though the estimates are somewhat smaller, indicating a 0.18 percent decline in intentional homicide death rates associated with an additional SAT facility.
23 Controls for county economic conditions are the unemployment rate and firm births; controls for demographics are the fraction of the population that is white, fraction black, fraction male, fraction 0-9 years old, fraction 10-19 years old, ... , fraction 60-69 years old.
24 Percent effects are calculated as (e β − 1) × 100%. 25 For a breakdown of justified and unjustified homicides in 2013, see https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crimein-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/expanded-homicide As described in Section 4, in all of our analyses we add one to outcome counts before constructing log rates to avoid dropping area-year observations for which the outcome would otherwise be undefined. We acknowledge that this transformation could introduce bias, especially for an outcome like the homicide rate which tends to be relatively low. Out of concern for this possibility, in Section 5.4 we will present estimates for each outcome based on an alternative approach in which we do not add one to outcome counts and we instead focus on areas for which outcome counts are positive in every year. These estimates are almost identical to our main results for nearly all of the outcomes we consider, including the overall homicide rate.
Homicides by Relationship
In Table 4 , we report the results of analyses that exploit the details available in the SHR data to separately consider homicides involving different victim-offender relationships. In particular, we explore the degree to which the reduction in homicides associated with SAT facilities (reported in Table 3 ) are driven by reductions in homicides committed by individuals who were friends or acquaintances of the victim, homicides committed by strangers, homicides committed by family members, and/or homicides in which the victim-offender relationship was not established by law enforcement. Victim-offender relationships can provide useful information regarding the nature of homicide incidents. For instance, investigators were unable to establish victim-offender relationships in 43 percent of homicides in our sample. These "uncleared" incidents are more likely to be gang, drug-related, and stranger homicides. 26 When the victim-offender relationship is known, friend groups account for 44 percent, strangers for 29 percent, and family for 27 percent of homicides.
The results shown in Table 4 suggest that the effects of SAT facilities on homicides are concentrated among homicide incidents in which the relationship to the offender was unknown or in which the offender was a friend. Specifically, these estimates indicate that an additional treatment facility leads to a 0.14 percent decline in "uncleared" homicides and a 0.26 percent decline in homicides where the offender was a friend of the victim. There is no evidence of effects on homicides committed by family members.
Violent Crimes More Broadly
Having established that SAT facilities reduce severe drug abuse and reduce the most costly of crimes (homicides), we next consider the degree to which treatment facilities affect other types of violent crimes. In Table 5 we show a detailed breakdown of the effects of SAT facilities on violent crimes based on analyses of the UCR Offenses Known data. While we focus our discussion below on the point estimates from models with the richest set of controls (Column 5), we note that the estimated effects are similar across specifications once state-by-year fixed effects and demographic controls are included as covariates. The estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of other county-year control variables.
Across the first four panels of Table 5 , we sequentially report the estimated effects on violent crimes of decreasing severity according to social cost estimates reported in McCollister, French and Fang (2010) : homicides ($9,881,198 per incident), sexual assault ($264,854), aggravated assault ($117,722), and simple assault. 27 We defer our consideration of robbery until the next section where we focus on financially motivated crimes. As mentioned above, the estimated effect on homicides indicates a significant reduction caused by SAT facilities. While the point estimate for the effect on sexual assault is also negative, suggesting that SAT facilities reduce sexual assault as well, it is not close to being statistically significant at conventional levels. The estimated effect on aggravated assaults also suggests a reduction in crime associated with SAT facilities, though this estimate is only marginally statistically significant. Finally, the estimates suggest no effect on simple assaults.
The mixed findings described above naturally raise the question of whether there is a "general effect" of SAT facilities on violent crime, or whether the significant effects we document are a result of random chance which becomes increasingly likely as one considers a larger set of outcomes. As described in Anderson (2008) , this issue can be addressed through the analysis of summary indices that are invariant to the number of outcomes considered. We take this approach across the final three panels of Table 5 as we consider violent crimes in the aggregate. First, we estimate the effect on all violent crimes and do not find a significant effect. This is not surprising because we did not find evidence of effects on simple assaults, which represent 77 percent of the crimes considered.
Second, we estimate the effect on all violent crimes that are typically considered felonies. This approach amounts to excluding simple assaults from the analysis, which encompass any attempted or completed physical contact with malicious intent that does not rise to the level of severity to constitute an aggravated assault. The results of this analysis indicate a statistically significant effect of SAT facilities on felony-type violent crimes. Table 6 shows the estimated effects on financially motivated crimes. We again sequentially report the estimated effects on crimes of decreasing severity according to social cost estimates: robbery ($46,541), motor vehicle theft ($11,849), burglary ($7,108), and larceny ($3,885). As with the estimated effects on violent crimes, these estimates suggest more pronounced effects of SAT facilities on relatively serious crimes. The point estimates indicate that a SAT facility reduces robbery by 0.11 percent, motor vehicle theft by 0.12 percent, burglary by 0.05 percent, and larceny by 0.04 percent.
Financially Motivated Crimes
The estimated effects on burglary and larceny are not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Our estimates of financially motivated crimes in the aggregate provide further evidence that SAT facilities reduce crime. The estimated effect on financially motivated crimes overall is almost the same as the estimated effect on larceny, which is not surprising since these crimes represent 65 percent of the crimes considered, and yields a p-value of 0.0720. Excluding larceny theft, which is often considered a misdemeanor offense, our estimates indicate that a SAT facility reduces financially motivated crimes by 0.08 percent (p-value = 0.0214). Finally and similar to our approach to violent crimes, we consider the log of the social costs of financially motivated crimes as a dependent variable. These estimates indicate that an additional SAT facility reduces social costs attributed to financially motivated crime by 0.07 percent annually. In dollar terms, this estimate suggests an approximate annual $60,000 decline in the social costs of financially motivate crimes. 30
Analysis of All Crimes Combined
The estimates in Tables 5 and 6 provide evidence that county-level expansions in treatment facilities significantly reduce both violent and financially motivated crimes and that the effects are concentrated among more serious types of these crimes. In Table 7 we present estimates that pool violent and financially motivated crimes together so that the estimates reflect the effects on overall crime. The first panel shows the effect of SAT facilities on all crime including the less serious crimes of simple assault and larceny, which account for 68 percent of all crimes considered. The estimates suggest a marginally significant 0.004 percent decline in crime associated with an additional SAT facility. Considering all felony-type crimes in the second panel, which excludes simple assault and larceny, the estimates indicate an effect of 0.010 percent. In the third panel, we report the estimated effects on the log of the social costs of crime, which weights each crime by its estimated social cost estimate as before. These estimates indicate that an additional SAT facility reduces social costs attributed to all crime by 0.14 percent annually, which corresponds to approximately $700,000. 31
Assessing Endogeneity and Lag Structure
As discussed in Section 4, the main threat to the validity of our empirical strategy is the possibility that changes in the number of facilities in an area might be driven by trends in the outcomes we consider (or the correlates thereof) and/or recent shocks to the outcomes we consider (or the correlates thereof). To the degree to which such trends and/or shocks occur at the state level or relate to changing demographics, economic conditions, or the size of police forces, they should be captured by state-year fixed effects and the control variables included in our analysis. As this is fundamentally untestable, we propose a test of the validity of our identification strategy based on examining the lead and lag structure of the estimated effects. Specifically, we estimate versions of Eq. (1) that consider the link between our outcome variables and the number of SAT facilities in a county in a future year.
We also expand on Eq. (1) to consider contemporaneous versus lagged measures of SAT fa-cilities. We do so in order to evaluate our choice to focus on the number of facilities in the prior year as our main variable of interest, a choice we made to avoid attenuation bias that would likely be caused by the fact that newly opened (or closed) facilities would only affect counties for some fraction of the year. Table 8 shows estimates of this type for all of the outcomes considered across Tables 2 through   7 . Specifically, it shows estimates based on our richest model while additionally considering the number of facilities in the current year and in the future year. Across the 24 outcomes we consider, the estimated effects of the number of facilities one year in the future is never statistically significant.
We interpret these results as evidence that reverse causality, or the possibility that changes in the number of SAT facilities may be driven by recent changes in drug abuse and related outcomes, is not a major concern. As such, these results provide support for a causal interpretation of our main results.
These results also provide support for our focus on the lagged measure of facilities. In particular,
where we see significant effects on outcomes, it is always the case that the number of treatment facilities in the prior year has a stronger effect than the number of treatment facilities in a given year. Moreover, the estimated effects of the number of treatment facilities in the current year is usually not statistically significant.
Further results along these lines are presented in Appendix Tables A3 through A8 . In these tables, we reproduce our main estimates in Column 1 for ease of comparison; in Column 2 we simultaneously consider the estimated effects of the number of SAT facilities in the preceding two years on current year outcomes; in Column 3 we simultaneously consider the estimated effects of the number of SAT facilities in the current year and the prior year on current year outcomes; and in Column 4, we simultaneously consider the estimated effects of the number of SAT facilities in the prior year, current year, and one year in the future, on current year outcomes (as in Table   8 ). The results of these analyses lead to the same conclusions as before. We also note that they sometimes indicate that the number of facilities two years prior is more strongly related to current year outcomes than the number of facilities on year prior, which suggests an important avenue for future work in exploring the effects of SAT facilities over time through alternative methodologies.
Alternative Empirical Approach
As an additional test of the robustness of our estimates, in Table 9 we show the estimated effects for each outcome based on the subset of areas for which the log outcome rate can be defined in each year without adding one. 32 For nearly all of the outcomes we consider, these estimates are virtually the same in both statistical and economic significance. The one exception is the homicide rate estimates by victim-offender relationship. For these outcomes, this approach produces estimated effects that are larger in magnitude for homicides in which the relationship is unknown and homicides committed by friends. As before, these are statistically significant while the estimated effects on homicides committed by strangers and family members are not.
Discussion and Conclusion
In the preceding sections, we document statistically and economically significant effects of SAT facilities on drug-related mortality and on several categories of crime. The updated estimates we provide for the effects on county-level drug-related mortality suggest that an additional SAT facility reduces drug-related mortality by 0.50 percent annually. Based on a value of 7 to 8 million dollars per expected life saved, the estimate implies a decline in a county's annual drug-related mortality costs by 4.2 to 4.8 million dollars. 33,34 Our estimates of the effects on agency-level crime indicate that an additional facility in a county reduces municipal felony-type crimes by 0.10 percent annually. In conjunction with social-cost-of-crime estimates from McCollister, French, and Fang (2010), our estimates indicate that an additional SAT facility in a county reduces municipal crime costs by 0.14 percent annually, which corresponds to approximately $700,000 per municipality.
Given an average of 6 municipal governments in each county, this suggests a decline in annual costs of county-level crime by approximately 4.2 million dollars for each additional facility. In total, these cost calculations suggest that the county-level benefits of an additional facility-in terms of drug-related mortality and criminal activity-are between 8.4 and 9 million dollars.
To compare these benefits to the annual costs of treatment at each facility, we can consider the average number of annual treatment admissions (255) from the National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS), and treatment modality-specific cost estimates from French, Popovici, and Tapsell (2008) . 35 A back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates that the annual costs 32 As such, the set of areas contributing to the estimates varies across outcomes, with fewer areas contributing to the estimates focusing on rarer outcomes such as homicides.
33 This estimate is based on 10.9 drug-related deaths per 100,000 and an an average weighted county population of 1.09 million.
34 Kniesner et al. (2010) suggest a 7 to 8 million dollar value of a statistical life (VSL) for health and safety regulation cost-benefit analyses, which is consistent with median VSL estimates from meta analysis of existing VSL research (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003) . 35 Estimates from French, Popovici, and Tapsell (2008) include all treatment delivery costs related to personnel, supplies and materials, contracted services, buildings and facilities, equipment, and miscellaneous items.
of treatment for a SAT facility are approximately 1.1 million dollars. 36 These calculations suggest that the benefits of expanding treatment facilities far outweigh the associated treatment costs.
While our data do not allow us to establish a direct link between substance-abuse treatment and incidents, the results of our analyses provide support for the idea that there are broad-based benefits of SAT facilities in terms of public safety. This evidence is in contrast to not-in-mybackyard arguments that have been used to hinder attempts to expand access to SAT through additional facilities. That said, an important limitation of our research design is that it identifies effects of having an additional SAT facility in the county, which could mask heterogeneous effects for areas in a county that are nearer versus farther from such a facility. Assessing whether such heterogeneity exists would seem to be an important avenue for future research. 36 We use the annual number of treatment admissions reported in Swensen (2015) Controls for economic conditions include the county unemployment rate and number of firm births. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the county and year levels are shown in parentheses. The regressions are weighted by county population.
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